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INTRODUCTION

On January 19, 2003, Bono, the famous lead singer of the band
U2, dropped an "F-bomb" that would have an atomic impact on the
way broadcast speech is regfffulated in the United States. During
the live broadcast of the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono
exclaimed, "this is really, really, fucking brilliant. Really, really
great."' While Bono has received global acclaim for working to

I Redcat23, Hands That Built America Award, YouTUBE (Mar. 25, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RGVwHizpmg (depicting the Golden Globe Awards
(NBC television broadcast Jan. 19, 2003).
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advance human rights throughout the world,2 little did he know
that a simple slip of the tongue would result in the free speech
rights of broadcasters in the United States coming under
unprecedented scrutiny. After the incident, numerous irate viewers
of the program filed complaints with the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"), claiming that Bono's use
of the word "fuck" violated the FCC's rules restricting the
broadcast of indecent material.3 This set the stage for a landmark
decision regarding what broadcast material the FCC could properly
classify as "indecent."
On March 18, 2004, the FCC issued a Memorandum Opinion
and Order ("2004 Order") holding that the live broadcast of the
2003 Golden Globe Awards-specifically, Bono's award speechwas indecent.4 However, the FCC recognized that this holding was
inconsistent with its prior holdings.5 Thus, the FCC explicitly
held, "the mere fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained
or repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is
otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not
indecent." 6 This portion of the 2004 Order emphasized that the
FCC was departing dramatically from its precedents and expanding
the definitional scope of "indecency." 7 However, despite the 2004
2

U2 Awarded Human Rights Accolade, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2005, 10:35 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4516066.stm; Josh Tyrangiel, Music: Bono,
TIME, Mar. 4, 2002, availableat http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,100193 1,00.html.
3
Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globes Awards" Program (Golden Globes I), 18 FCC Rcd. 19859, 19859 (2003)
(subsequent history omitted).
4
Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globes Awards" Program (Golden Globes II), 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976, 4982
(2004).
S Id. at 4980. The FCC refrained from imposing any penalty on the broadcasters in
this case because the Golden Globes broadcast was permissible under the Commission's
prior policy. Id. at 4981-82.
6
Id. at 4980.
See id. at 4980 ("While prior Commission and staff action have indicated that
isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the 'F-word' such as that here are not indecent or would
not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such
interpretation is no longer good law."); see also id. at 4980 n.32 (citing cases where the
Commission has not found content indecent because the use of the "F-Word" was
isolated or fleeting).
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Order's meticulous wording, the extent to which the FCC
expanded the definition of indecency in so holding remains hazy at
best.8
FCC decisions prior to the 2004 Order had held that isolated or
fleeting uses of "fuck," or similar expletives, were not indecent in
situations similar to Bono's speech.9 These so-called "fleeting
expletives" had fallen outside of the scope of indecency since the
beginning of the FCC's prohibition on indecent broadcast
material.' 0 The rationale underlying the prior decisions was that
fleeting expletives did not "describe or depict sexual or excretory
organs or activities,"" but were instead used accidentally or as
"adjective[s] or expletive[s] to emphasize . .. exclamation[s]."l2
These precedents established that any indecency determination
must involve a thorough examination of the context surrounding an
expletive's utterance, rather than declaring in blanket fashion that
The FCC subsequently created two exceptions for fleeting expletives that were
either "essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work or essential to informing
viewers on a matter of public importance." In re Complaints Regarding Various
Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299, 13315
(2006) (subsequent history omitted). These exceptions have been used to justify the
differential treatment of separate broadcasts, both of which contained use of fleeting
expletives. Compare Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their
Broads. on Nov. 11, 2004, of the ABC Television Network's Presentation of the Film
"Saving Private Ryan," 20 FCC Rcd. 4507, 4512-13 (2005) (finding expletives broadcast
as part of a gritty, dramatic war film to fall within the "artistic necessity" exception), with
Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4978 (finding that while an expletive may have been
used "as an intensifier," the core meaning of the word was inherently sexual and
therefore, indecent).
See, e.g., Lincoln Deller, 8 FCC Rcd. 2582, 2585 (1993) (holding that a news
announcer's statement: "Ooops, fucked that one up" was not indecent); L.M. Commc'ns
of S.C., Inc., 7 FCC Rcd. 1595, 1595 (1992); Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case
Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad.
Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8008 (2001) ("[W]here sexual or excretory references
have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, the characteristic has
tended to weigh against a finding of indecency.").
10 See WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978) (stating the
Commission's intention to continue considering repetition as a factor when making
indecency determinations); Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699 (1987),
supersededin part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (en banc).
11 Golden Globes 1, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859, 19860 (2003) (citing Indus. Guidance, 16
FCC Rcd. at 8002).
12
Golden Globes I, 18 FCC Rcd. at 19860.
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individual words or phrases are indecent when used in any
context.13
In the 2004 Order, the FCC eschewed this contextual approach
to indecent speech by holding that "given the core meaning of the
'F-Word,' any use of that word or a variation, in any context
The 2004 Order
inherently has a sexual connotation...."14
further held that any use of the word "fuck" "invariably invokes a
coarse sexual image . . .. If the Commission were routinely not to

take action against isolated and gratuitous uses of such language on
broadcasts when children were expected to be in the audience, this
would likely lead to more widespread use of offensive language." 5
While the FCC claimed that the new policy announced in the 2004
Order was within the constitutional limit of its authority to regulate
indecent broadcast content, 16 the Commission did not provide
much reasoning for the sudden policy shift.17 This issue set the
stage for the policy's first encounter with the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
This Note will examine the resultant struggle by the Supreme
Court and the Second Circuit to reconcile the FCC's policy with
longstanding principles of free speech embodied in the First
Amendment. It will also examine the evolution of the FCC's
approach to indecency regulation-from a limited one that strictly
obeyed the Supreme Court's admonishments to an expansive one
that has struggled to keep pace with the explosion of racy content
on the airwaves over the past thirty years. Finally, it will examine
the variety of jurisprudential positions that may be taken when

14

See Indus. Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8002.
Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4978 (2004) (emphasis added).

"

Id. at 4979.

13

Id. at 4982 ("The Court explicitly left open the issue of whether an occasional
expletive could be considered indecent." (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., Inc., 438 U.S.
726, 749-50 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality)).
1
Justice Breyer points out that the FCC dedicated a mere two sentences to discussing
its reasons for abandoning its prior policy: "' [O]ur decision is not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica. The Court explicitly left open the issue of whether an
16

occasional expletive could be considered indecent.' . . . These two sentences are not a

summary of the FCC's discussion about why it abandoned its prior understanding of
Pacifica. They are the discussion." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II), 129 S.
Ct. 1800, 1834 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. at
4982).
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attempting to assess the constitutionality of the FCC's so-called
"fleeting expletive" policy by looking to the opinions of the
Second Circuit and the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has expressed
many disparate views regarding the constitutionality of the FCC's
policy.' 8
It will be argued herein that the FCC's presumption-that the
use of certain words, regardless of context, invariably falls within
prohibition-is
indecency
FCC's
of the
the scope
unconstitutionally broad. The most appropriate way to resolve the
constitutional issue of whether the FCC's fleeting expletive policy
violates the First Amendment would be to hold that the distinction
between indecent expression and acceptable expression depends on
the context of the expletive's use. Justice Stevens expressed this
distinction eloquently: "There is a critical distinction between the
use of an expletive to describe a sexual or excretory function and
the use of such a word for an entirely different purpose, such as to
express an emotion. One rests at the core of indecency; the other
stands miles apart."' 9 This would require the FCC to retreat from
its current policy of aggressive enforcement back to its pre-2004
policy of presuming such fleeting expletives not to be indecent,
absent a contextual determination to the contrary.
FCC's FIRST ENCOUNTERS WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND
SECOND CIRCUIT
The FCC's decision to expand the scope of its indecency
regulation spawned a prolonged legal battle between itself and the
United States' most powerful public broadcasting companies.
I.

THE

I"
See id. at 1817 ("[T]his Court's holding in Pacifica ... drew no constitutional line;
to the contrary, it expressly declined to express any view on the constitutionality of
prohibiting isolated indecency." (citation omitted)); id. at 1820-22 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that the FCC's policy of regulating indecency has violated the First
Amendment since its inception); id. at 1827-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
Commission has adopted an interpretation of 'indecency' that bears no resemblance to
what Pacifica contemplated."); id. at 1828-29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Tjhere is no
way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the Commission has
done.").
19 Id. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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While the policy announced in the 2004 Order, holding that
fleeting expletives in certain contexts could be declared indecent,
remained contentious from its inception, it was not until 2006, in
an order entitled In the Matter of Complaints Regarding Various
Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8,
200520 ("2006 Order"), that this legal battle began. The case, later
decided under the name Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,2 1
concerned two live television broadcasts aired by Fox Television
Stations, Inc. and several other well-established television
broadcast companies.2 2 The first broadcast was a segment of the
2002 Billboard Music Awards, where the singer Cher exclaimed,
while receiving an award, "People have been telling me I'm on the
way out every year, right? So fuck 'em." 2 3 The second was a
segment of the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, where Nicole
Richie, a reality television personality, exclaimed, while presenting
an award, "Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada
purse? It's not so fucking simple."2 4 Richie made the statement to
Paris Hilton, her companion on a television series, after Hilton
reminded Richie to "watch the bad language." 25
On March 15, 2006, after receiving numerous complaints
concerning these broadcasts, the FCC released notices of apparent
liability to the broadcasts' licensees.26 Following a voluntary
remand by the FCC, wherein the broadcasters had an opportunity
to present their objections to the notices, the FCC issued the 2006
Order upholding the indecency findings for the named
broadcasts.2 7 The 2006 Order unambiguously relied upon the 2004
Order's newly announced rule that fleeting expletives could be
declared indecent because "the mere fact that specific words or
In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Red. 13299 (2006).
21
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007)
(subsequent history omitted).
22
Id. at 452.
23
Id.
24
id.
25
Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1808 (2009).
26
Id.
27
In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8,2005, 21 FCC Red. 13299 (2006).
20
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phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate a finding
that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast
medium is not indecent." 28 The licensees appealed the FCC's
2006 Order to the Second Circuit. 29
A. The UnitedStates Supreme Court and Second Circuit'sReview
of the FCC'sPolicy Under the Administrative ProcedureAct
The series of decisions by the Supreme Court and Second
Circuit in the Fox caseS30 first reviewed the FCC's fleeting
expletives policy under the Administrative Procedure Act. 3 1 The
Administrative Procedure Act grants courts the authority to set
aside actions by administrative agencies that are found to be
"arbitrary, capricious,... contrary to constitutional right, . . . [or]
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations .... 32
The question of whether agency action is "arbitrary" or
"capricious" requires a court to examine whether the agency has
"offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
While this standard of review is considered
expertise."33
"narrow," the agency must provide a "satisfactory explanation for
its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made."' 34
The Supreme Court and Second Circuit reviewed the FCC's
explanation for changing its policy from one that did not punish
fleeting expletives to one that did. Making such an assessment
required consideration of several factors, including: (1) any
statutory restraints placed by Congress on the FCC's enforcement

Id. at 13305, 13323-24.
See Fox I, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
30 See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Fox 1, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 11l), 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
31 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2006).
32
Id § 706(2)(A)C).
3 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
34
Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
28
29
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of 18 U.S.C. § 1464;35 (2) the extent to which broadcasters have
relied on the FCC's prior policy; and (3) whether the FCC's stated
reasons for changing its policy are rational and "in accord with the
[FCC's] proper understanding of its authority." 36 The Supreme
Court and the Second Circuit also had to consider whether the
FCC's policy violated the First Amendment, but neither the
Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. ("Fox Il") 37
nor the Second Circuit in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC
("Fox 1")38 decided the constitutional question presented by the
FCC's prohibition on fleeting expletives. 39
While the main focus of this Note is whether the FCC's policy
violates the First Amendment, it is also important to briefly discuss
the opinions of the Supreme Court and Second Circuit on the
administrative law issues presented by the Fox cases because the
analysis of this decision sheds some light on the First Amendment
discussion. A serious issue presented by the case was whether the
FCC should be subjected to a heightened standard of review under
the Administrative Procedure Act for adopting a position that was
diametrically opposed to its initial policy. 40 The reasoning
provided by the FCC for changing its policy can help to clarify the
FCC's understanding of what constitutes "indecent" broadcast
content before and after it had changed its policy.
1. The Second Circuit Holds that the FCC's Change in Policy
is "Arbitrary" and "Capricious"
The Second Circuit reversed the 2006 Order and found that the
FCC's reasoning for changing its policy regarding broadcast
liability for fleeting expletives was insufficient to withstand
scrutiny under the Administrative Procedure Act.4 1 The court first
noted that the FCC clearly had changed its policy from one that
18 U.S.C. § 1464 grants the FCC authority to punish utterance of "any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(2006). See infra Section IV.A.
36
Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1806-10, 1823.
3
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
3
489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
3 See Fox II,129 S. Ct. at 1819; Fox 1,489 F.3d at 462.
40
See generally Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Fox I, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
41
See Fox 1, 489 F.3d at 458-60.
3
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"had consistently taken the view that isolated, non-literal, fleeting
expletives did not run afoul of its indecency regime" to one that
now considered fleeting expletives potentially indecent. 42 The
court held that because the FCC had "flip-flop[ped]" between two
diametrically opposed policies, it was required to provide "a
reasoned explanation of why the new rule effectuates the statute as
well as or better than the old rule."4 3
The FCC argued that its change in policy was consistent with
its original justification for regulating indecent broadcast
material.4 It maintained that its policy would prevent broadcasters
from striking the "first blow" against unsuspecting, unwilling
listeners by airing programs that contained fleeting expletives.4 5
The Second Circuit rejected the FCC's explanation, holding that
the FCC had not provided a "reasonable explanation for why it has
changed its perception that a fleeting expletive was not a harmful
'first blow."' 46 Nor did the FCC explain how its prohibition on
fleeting expletives bore any rational connection to its so-called
"first blow" theory.4 7 The Second Circuit also rejected the FCC's
argument that non-literal uses of expletives fall within its
indecency definition because of the difficulty associated with
determining whether an expletive is being used "as an expletive or
as a literal description of sexual or excretory functions," stating
that such an argument "defies any commonsense understanding of
The court concluded by discussing how
these words."4 8

Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 457 (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Council, Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985)).
44
See id at 457-58. ("[T]he Supreme Court justified the FCC's regulation of the
broadcast media in part on the basis that indecent material on the airwaves enters into the
privacy of the home uninvited and without warning.") (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality)).
45 See id. ("To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after
the first blow.").
46
See id.at 458.
47
See id ("As the FCC itself stressed during oral argument in this case, the
Commission does not take the position that any occurrence of an expletive is indecent or
profane under its rules.").
42

43

48

Id. at 459.
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broadcasters have come to rely on the FCC's tolerance of fleeting
expletives over the past thirty years.4 9
2. The United States Supreme Court Reverses the Second
Circuit's Ruling
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second
Circuit's ruling, stating that the FCC's change in policy was not
arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.50
However, the Court found itself sharply divided on the issue of
how extensive an explanation an administrative agency must
provide for its change in policy to withstand scrutiny under the
Administrative Procedure Act.5 1 In a plurality opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, the Court held that the FCC should not be subject to
a higher standard of review for reversing its prior policy with
52
He reasoned that the
regard to fleeting expletives.
Administrative Procedure Act does not distinguish between an
"initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or
revising that action." 53 Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded,
"[I]t suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to
be better, which the conscious change of course adequately

indicates." 54
Upon reviewing the FCC's policy under this standard, Justice
Scalia found that the FCC's new policy was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. 5 He further found that the Commission's approach to
fleeting expletives was consistent with Congress's purpose in
authorizing the FCC to regulate broadcast indecency, stating, "It is
surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor for
single words would 'likely lead to more widespread use of the
He also noted the extent to which
offensive language ....
broadcast-censoring technology has advanced since the beginning
49

See id. at 461.

50

See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1812.

51

See generally id

52

s
54
ss
56

See id. at 1810-11 (Scalia, J., plurality).
Id at 1811.
id.
Id. at 1812.
Id. at 1812-13 (quoting Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004)).
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of the FCC's regulatory regime and argued that such advances
support the FCC's new policy by minimizing the financial and
technical burdens posed by censoring fleeting expletives contained
in live broadcasts.5 7 Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit for
demanding empirical evidence from the FCC to demonstrate the
harmful effects of broadcast profanity on children, stating that the
Second Circuit was
"[insisting]
upon obtaining the
unobtainable." 58
Justice Breyer, joined by three other justices, dissented from
Justice Scalia's opinion. 59 Justice Breyer argued that the FCC
must explain why it has changed its policy, rather than simply
provide an explanation as to why its new policy is a good one.6 0
He did not purport to apply a "heightened standard" of review, but
instead sought the "application of the same standardof review to
different. circumstances, namely circumstances characterized by
the fact that change is at issue." 61 Justice Breyer reasoned that the
FCC's proffered explanation contained two glaring omissions that
rendered it insufficient. 62 First, the FCC failed to reconcile its new
policy with the First Amendment's prohibition on media
censorship that has constrained its enforcement power since the
agency's inception. 63 Second, the FCC failed to address the
burden that its policy would place on local broadcasters who could
not afford the advanced "bleeping" technology that the FCC
64
claimed would facilitate censoring fleeting expletives.
With most of the Court divided, a critical vote lay in the hands
of Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring
opinion that accepted the dissenters' view that the FCC should be
57

Id at 1813.

58

Id

s9

See generally id
Id at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

60

61

Id. at 1831.

Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1833 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The FCC . .. failed to
consider two critically important aspects of the problem that underlay its initial policy
judgment . . . .").
See id. at 1833-35 ("[T]he FCC had explicitly rested its prior policy in large part
upon the need to avoid treading too close to the constitutional line."). Justice Stevens
also claimed that the FCC's policy was based on a complete misreading of Pacifica.See
id at 1826-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6
Id. at 1835-37.
62
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required to explain why it "reject[ed] the considerations that led it
to adopt that initial policy." 65 He explained that the "unique
constitutional position" of administrative agencies in the American
form of government places a special burden upon them to
extensively demonstrate that they are not exceeding the boundaries
of their congressionally delegated authority or violating the
Constitution.66 However, he concurred with the judgment of the
plurality, stating that while the FCC's reasons for changing its
policy could not be considered "a model for agency
explanation ... [they] were the sort of reasons an agency may
consider and act upon." 67 He viewed the FCC's departure from its
prior policy as a decision based upon a changed interpretation of
constitutional law limiting its enforcement power, rather than a
change in factual circumstances surrounding the broadcasting
industry.68 Thus, to the extent that a majority of the Court held
that agencies must provide a detailed explanation why they change
from a prior policy upon which citizens rely to a new policy,
Justice Scalia may have won the battle, but he lost the war.
B. Transitioningfrom the Administrative Law Issue to the First
Amendment Issue in Fox
In addition to the administrative law question, both the
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit expressed deep concern
regarding whether the FCC's newly crafted policy conflicted with
the First Amendment, but avoided deciding that serious
constitutional issue. 69 Instead, much of the discussion surrounding
the administrative law issue in Fox I and Fox II centered on
whether the FCC had altered its understanding of what constituted
actionable indecency in broadcast media. If so, the FCC was
Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Fox 11, 129 S. Ct. at 1831 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
66
Id. at 1823.
67 Id. at 1824.
65

68

Id.

Id. at 1819 (Scalia, J., plurality) ("It is conceivable that the Commission's orders
may cause some broadcasters to avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission's
reach under the Constitution."); Fox 1, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[Wle are
skeptical that the Commission can provide a reasoned explanation for its 'fleeting
expletive' regime that would pass constitutional muster.").
69
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required to explain how its decision was consistent with the
constitutional limits placed on its regulatory power. 70 However,
assessing the adequacy of any such explanation would effectively
require the Supreme Court to state its own interpretation of what
constitutional limits are placed on the FCC, and the extent to which
the FCC violated them. Thus, in accordance with the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, 7 ' the Supreme Court had no choice but to
remand the case to the Second Circuit for review of the
constitutional issue. 72
On remand, the Second Circuit held that the policy violated the
First Amendment.
The court held that the policy was
impermissibly vague because it failed to give notice to
broadcasters as to what words and expressions are prohibited.74
This constitutional defect in the FCC's policy resulted from the
FCC's creation of exceptionally broad, discretionary tests for what
constitutes prohibited content and what content falls into one of the
protected exceptions.7 5 "If government officials are permitted to
make decisions on an 'ad hoc' basis, there is a risk that those
decisions will reflect the officials' subjective biases." 76 The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review whether the
FCC's current enforcement regime violates the First Amendment.
The Court's ruling will stand as the most significant ruling on
broadcast indecency since the Court's first encounter with the
doctrine in FCC v. PacificaFoundation.
See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1930 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
For a brief discussion on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, see Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there
is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.").
72
See generally Fox I, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
7
See Fox III, 613 F.3d at 330.
74
Id. at 330-32.
7
Id. at 331-32.
76 Id. at 332 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972)).
7
Fox III, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010) cert. granted,79 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S. Jun. 27,
2011) (Nos. 12-1293).
7
The Court has not reviewed a single case discussing the constitutionality of the
FCC's regulation of allegedly indecent content in the broadcast media context since FCC
v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). However, several circuit courts have issued opinions
regarding the extent to which indecent content that is broadcast publicly is protected by
the First Amendment, and the extent to which the FCC's regulation infringes on that
70

7

2011]

THE FATE OFINDECENCY

1047

II. THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Before examining the First Amendment issue presented by Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC in depth, it is necessary to
examine the background principles that govern cases involving
laws that allegedly violate the First Amendment. The FCC's
regulation of indecent speech is one of many examples of so-called
"content-specific" restrictions on speech. Laws and regulations of
this sort punish certain kinds of speech based on their subject
matter or message.7 9 These restrictions are distinct from "contentneutral" restrictions, which do not attempt to regulate speech on
the basis of its message or subject matter, but instead because the
speech creates secondary effects, such as violence or immorality,
or is being uttered in an inappropriate time, manner or place.8 0
A. Content-Specific Speech Restrictions in General
A bedrock principle of First Amendment law is that the
The
government cannot restrict speech based on its content.
82
occasions.
Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle on many
Any such content-specific restriction on free speech is considered
presumptively invalid, and must be subjected to strict scrutiny. 83
Conversely, content-neutral restrictions are subjected to
intermediate scrutiny because they do not create as high of a risk of
allowing the government to exercise control over the ideas and
views of its citizens. 84 This reflects another important principle of

protection. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT III), 58 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
7
See Geoffrey Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar
Case ofSubject-MatterRestrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978).
80
See, e.g, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 85-86 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
81

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 932 (3d ed.

2006).
82
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).
83
See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642 ("Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny
to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech
because of its content.").
See id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984));
84
see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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First Amendment law: all speech is to be protected equally by the
government, regardless of its message.
Despite this strong presumption against content-specific
restrictions, there are certain circumstances where the Court has
been willing to tolerate them. These circumstances often involve
forms of speech that are considered unworthy of the full protection
Such speech can be entirely
of the First Amendment. 86
or it can be protected by the
Amendment,
the
First
unprotected by
First Amendment but classified as "low value" speech so that the
Examples of
government may more easily regulate it.87
unprotected speech include speech that incites illegal activity,88
fighting words,89 defamation,90 and obscenity. 9 1 Examples of low
value speech include sexually explicit, but not obscene, broadcast
speech 92 and commercial speech. 93
1.

A Hierarchy of First Amendment Protection?
A significant issue arises when attempting to reconcile these
examples of "low value" and unprotected speech with the Court's
ardent support for the expansive and equal protection of speech in
Many view these examples as
most other circumstances.
inconsistent with the belief that the First Amendment should apply
equally to all forms of speech, regardless of its subject matter or

See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 20, 28 (1975) ("[T]he essence of the first amendment is its denial to
government of the power to determine which messages shall be heard and which
suppressed." (discussing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92)).
86 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying
text.
87
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 986.
88
See generallyBrandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
89
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include . . . insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.").
90 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 (1964).
91
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
92
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality).
9
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980).
85
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message. 94 Others have argued that these speech classifications do
not compromise the principle of equal First Amendment protection
for all speech, but instead illustrate that other state interests may
sometimes outweigh the state's interest in protecting free speech,
The
and can thus withstand First Amendment scrutiny.95
resolution to this conflict is not completely clear, and the Supreme
Court has reformulated its approach to the issues of unprotected
and low value speech on several occasions. 96
In some cases, the Supreme Court has held that laws regulating
unprotected or "low value" speech are subject only to rational basis
review. 97 In others, the Supreme Court has held that such laws
must be subject to strict scrutiny, particularly if they depend on
content-specific distinctions among different kinds of unprotected
speech.9 8 This disparity, as well as the malleable distinction
between content-specific and content-neutral restrictions, has led
some to argue that the Supreme Court has not yet articulated a
See, e.g., Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 789, 781-83 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Pacifica,438 U.S. at 761-62 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
9
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
96
The Supreme Court has most recently reaffirmed its belief in a hierarchy of First
Amendment protection in Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). The Court held that
the First Amendment prevents the father of a deceased military service member from
bringing a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a group that staged
an anti-homosexual demonstration near the site of his son's funeral. Id at 1219. The
Court stated that speech "concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government . . . [and therefore] occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection." Id. at 1215 (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that "[s]peech deals
with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community, . . . or when it is a subject of
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest of value and concern to the
public." Id. at 1216 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004); Connick, 461
U.S. at 146) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9
See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 501 (Warren, J., concurring) (stating that a federal statute
punishing the mailing of obscene publications and the sale and advertising of obscene
books should be upheld as "a rational exercise of power").
9
See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding
that restrictions on television broadcasts containing sexually explicit content are subject
to strict scrutiny); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 405-06 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring) (stating that city ordinance prohibiting racially motivated "fighting words"
could not be considered "reasonably necessary" to achieve a compelling state interest).
94
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consistent approach to deciding what speech is fully protected by
the First Amendment, and that this inconsistency has diminished
the overall protection for certain kinds of unpopular and
controversial speech. 99 An additional concern is that the Supreme
Court has not created sufficiently specific categories detailing what
speech is entitled to less First Amendment protection. These
concerns are especially salient in the context of sexually explicit
speech.
Obscenity, Indecency, Profanity and the First
Amendment
The Supreme Court has scrutinized federal and state laws and
regulations that have burdened speech involving the depiction of
sexual or excretory activities or pervasive use of profanity on many
occasions.100 The Court has reached a variety of differing
conclusions in these cases. In cases involving what the Court
describes as "obscene" speech, the Court has held that such speech
is entirely unprotected by the First Amendment,' 0 ' stating that such
speech is "utterly without redeeming social importance."' 02
However, the Court has created strict limitations on what speech
could be considered obscene under the First Amendment.1 03 The
Court generally has regarded only vivid, pornographic depictions
2.

Compare R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 377, with Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
9
U.S. 765 (2002).
100 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
"o1 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 492-93. Many theorists have disagreed with the conclusion
that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment. See David Cole, Playingby
Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 111,
169-70 (1994).
102
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
103
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
The basic guidelines .

.

. must be: (a) whether "the average person,

applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b)

whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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or discussions of sexual or excretory activity as actionable

obscenity.1 04
The Supreme Court has also encountered cases involving
speech that it did not characterize as obscene, but instead described
as "low value" speech. The Court has used this characterization in
cases involving nude dancinglos and adult theaters,10 6 but has never
explicitly defined the boundaries of this category.107 Many
theorists regard this category of speech as controversial because
the Supreme Court has subjected laws and regulations that burden
"low value" speech to a lower standard of scrutiny than other
content-specific restrictions, despite the Court's insistence that
such speech is protected by the First Amendment.1 08 They argue
that this category of speech illustrates that the Court has created a
hierarchy of First Amendment classifications over the years, which
has tempered certain First Amendment protections for the sake of
furthering other state interests, such as protecting public morality
or preventing the exposure of children to indecent material.109
Finally, there are cases in which the Court has discussed the
level of First Amendment protection provided for profane or
sexually oriented language. The Court has generally held that such
speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection. In Cohen v.
California,1"0 the Court stated the broad principle that "the State
has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is

104 See id. at 25.

1os

See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991).

106 See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976).

107 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975)
(holding that
nudity is not by itself enough to place speech in this category).
108 See id. at 220; see also John E. Taylor, The Religion Clauses in the 21st Century,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 229 n.18 (2007).
109 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (discussing the
extent to which expressive conduct that is considered indecent is deserving of First
Amendment protection); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 760-61 (1985) ("[Sipeech on public issues occupies 'the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection. . . . In
contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment
concern." (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., concurring)
(advocating a hierarchy of speech protections under the First Amendment).
"0 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.""'
However, the Court also has implemented several exceptions to
this principle-the most notable exception being the regulation of
indecent material on free television and radio stations. 112 The
Court has justified these exceptions on the basis of protecting socalled "captive audiences," a term loosely used to describe
unwitting listeners or viewers who might find the speech at issue
offensive.11 3 Despite these exceptions for over-the-air broadcast
media, the Court has been reluctant to create exceptions for other
types of media, such as the telephone,1 4 cable television" and the
Internet.l16
B. Vagueness and Overbreadthas Limitations on Content-Specific
Regulations
Even if a content-specific restriction on speech is supported by
a compelling state interest or is intended to burden only
unprotected or "low value" speech, there are other important
requirements that any permissible content-specific regulation must
meet to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. First, a contentspecific restriction must not be so unduly vague that it fails to give
a reasonable person proper notice of what is prohibited and what is
permitted.11 7 The Second Circuit relied upon this "vagueness
doctrine" in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC ("Fox Il)"
where it invalidated the FCC's fleeting expletive policy for failing
to provide broadcasters with proper notice of what fleeting
expletives are actionably indecent."' 9 The Supreme Court has
stated that the vagueness doctrine plays an important role in the
First Amendment context because vague laws or regulations might
"'

Id. at 25.

See generallyFCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
See id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring); Mary Strauss, Redefining the Captive
Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 90-91 (1991).
114
See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 115-16 (1989).
115 See generally United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000);
Denver Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
116
See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
117 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
" 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
112

"

"9

See id. at 334.
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chill free speech: "Because First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity."12 0

Second, content-specific restrictions must not be "substantially
overbroad" by regulating significantly more speech than the
Constitution allows.121 Content-specific restrictions extend beyond
what is permissible by the Constitution when they regulate
substantially more speech that is fully protected by the First
Amendment than speech that justifiably may be regulated under
the First Amendment. The Court has stated that the "overbreadth
doctrine" is also intended to prevent a chilling effect on protected
speech.122 In the context of content-specific regulations, the
overbreadth doctrine plays an important role in protecting the
rights of "willing listeners" from infringement by laws that seek to
excessively prioritize the protection of "unwilling listeners" from
Similar to the
potentially indecent or offensive speech.1 23
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine also requires a close
connection between the scope of a restriction's speech prohibition
and the policy interests which justify that restriction's enforcement
under the First Amendment.' 24

III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FCC's CRUSADE

AGAINST

INDECENCY

Before delving into an exploration of the FCC's history of
battling indecent television and radio broadcasts, it is important to
remember that the FCC's regulatory ambit has been limited by the
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (emphasis added) (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). This concern was also mentioned in Fox III,
613 F.3d at 325.
121
Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-67. Challenges for overbreadth allow
parties in cases where a regulation could be applied consistent with the Constitution to
argue that a law is facially invalid because it would be unconstitutional as applied to
others. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003).
122
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-612 (1973).
123
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 812 (2000); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). ("[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting
listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of
giving offense.").
124 Schad, 452 U.S.
at 67.
120
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Supreme Court in several important ways outside of the issue
presented in Fox. First, the Supreme Court requires the FCC to
consider the existence of any less restrictive alternatives to banning
broadcast content, such as technological blocking or selective
cable subscriptions, before expanding its enforcement of indecency
regulation to other forms of media or broadcasts.125 This is
required for any content-specific regulation enacted by the FCC to
pass strict scrutiny.126 Second, the Supreme Court has stressed that
the rights of willing listeners may not be completely obliterated in
order to further the FCC's goal of preventing indecent content
from reaching children or unwilling listeners.' 27 This rationale
also requires the FCC to thoroughly consider the existence of less
restrictive alternatives.' 2 8
A. The CommunicationsAct of 1934 and FCC v. Pacifica
The origin of all content-specific broadcast regulation in the
United States is the Communications Act of 1934 ("the Act").12 9
The Act established the FCC in order to formulate and enforce "a
unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the [broadcast]
industry."1 30 Section 1464 of the Act provides the FCC with the
power to regulate obscene, indecent or profane speech through
fines, imprisonment or both.131 The seemingly straightforward
wording of Section 1464 masks the inherent difficulty of
discerning the limitations on the FCC's ability to perform this
function. This ambiguity is especially pernicious in light of the
FCC's authority to enforce the statute with fines amounting to over
$1,000,000 and two years of imprisonment.' 32 The threat of
125
126
127
128

129
130

See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989).
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814 (2000).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
id

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).

"' 18 U.S.C. § 1464 ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both."). There is a safe harbor for broadcasts containing indecent content
between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM each day. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1995).
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) (establishing the
statutory maximum penalty for an indecency violation at $325,000 if the violation is
passing and $3,000,000 if the violation is continuing). Congress increased the statutory
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retaliatory action by the FCC has the potential to chill valuable

broadcast speech.133
The Supreme Court recognized this concern in its landmark
FCC v. Pacifical34 decision. The case involved a daytime radio
broadcast of comedian George Carlin's monologue "Filthy
Words."' 3 5 The FCC received a complaint from a man who heard
the broadcast while traveling with his son in his car one
afternoon.136 The FCC issued a declaratory order holding the
broadcast companies that aired the monologue liable for
broadcasting indecent speech.137 The broadcasters appealed the
FCC's order to the D.C. Circuit, and finally to the Supreme
Court.138
The Court granted certiorari to consider whether the FCC's
order violated the First Amendment.' 39 Justice Stevens' majority
opinion began by adopting the FCC's "generic" definition of
indecency: "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs . . . .,,140 He
noted that any speech that falls within this definition "surely lie[s]
at the periphery of First Amendment concern." 4 1
On these facts, the Court held that the FCC's order did not
violate the First Amendment.14 2 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
First Amendment permits government authorities to regulate
certain speech based on its content and context, citing the familiar
minimum for passing and continuing violations from $32,000 and $300,000 to $325,000
and $3,000,000, respectively, in 2005. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-235, § 193, 120 Stat. 491, 491 (2006).
133 Seth T. Goldsamt, "Crucified by the FCC"? Howard Stern, the FCC, and Selective
Prosecution,28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 203, 205-06 (1995).
14
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
135 Id. at 729.
136 Id. at 729-30.
137 Id. ("The Commission did not impose formal sanctions, but it did state that the order

would be associated with the station's license file . . . ... (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
'

"
140

See id. at 733-35.
Id. at 734.

Id. at 731-32.

141 Id. at 743.
142

Id. at 747-50.
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"fire in a crowded theatre" example from Schenck v. United
States.143 He also cited examples, including obscenity regulation
under Section 1464, where speech receives no protection under the
First Amendment whatsoever.144 Nevertheless, he maintained that
indecent speech was not entirely outside the protection of the First
Amendment, despite characterizing the speech at issue as "vulgar,
offensive, and shocking . . . .
Instead, "[the Court] must
consider [the speech's] context in order to determine whether the
Commission's action was constitutionally permissible." 46
He continued by stating that broadcast speech has received the
most limited form of First Amendment protection.147 The reasons
for this limited protection were twofold:
First, the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen,
not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder....
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children,

143

even

those

too

young

to

read.

...

Id. at 744-45.
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . . The

question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent.
Id (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
14 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (Stevens, J., plurality) (discussing fighting words)). See generally Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (discussing commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (discussing libelous speech); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (discussing obscenity).
145 Pacica, 438 U.S. at 747-48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Stevens, J.,
plurality).
146

jd.

147

Id. at 748.
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Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's
vocabulary in an instant.148
Operating on this premise, Justice Stevens argued that the
FCC's restriction of broadcasters' speech rights was justified by
the public interest in protecting children from indecent content

within the home.149
Justice Stevens' opinion concluded by emphasizing that the
Court's holding was limited to the facts before it.1 so The Court
recognized the extremely case-specific nature of every indecency
analysis, and anticipated that the FCC would not dramatically
expand its enforcement regime beyond instances of repeated use of
expletives "as a sort of verbal shock treatment."' 5 1 While the
Court sidestepped the issue of whether expanded enforcement of
the FCC's indecency regulation would violate the First
Amendment, its consistent focus on the context and intensity of the
allegedly indecent broadcast at issue in Pacifica suggests that the
First Amendment demands something more than the occasional
expletive before speech may be labeled indecent.
B. GradualAbandonment ofRegulatory Restraint
For several years following the Pacifica decision, the FCC
seemed to get the message, as it did not punish fleeting or isolated

148 Id. at 748-49. The second of these rationales has recently come under increased
scrutiny following the Court's decision in LorillardTobacco Co. v. Reilly. In Lorillard,
the Court held that regulations intending to prevent the advertising of tobacco products to
children violated the First Amendment by excessively restricting constitutional speech
desired by adults. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 25 (2001).
149
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., plurality). The Commission also noted
two additional factors in its initial order in Pacifica:"[U]nconsenting adults may tune in a
station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and ...
there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore
license in the public interest." Id. at 731 (quoting Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Foundation Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 97 (1975)).
15o

See id. at 750.

' Id. at 760-61. (Powell, J., concurring). The Court appeared to foreshadow the issue
presented in Fox by noting that "[t]he Commission's holding, and certainly the Court's
holding today, does not speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially
offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from the verbal shock
treatment administered by respondent here." Id.
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expletives over the next decade.' 52 Indeed, the FCC did not find a
single broadcast indecent between 1978 and 1987.153 This period
of dormancy for indecency regulation could be attributed to the
FCC's strict interpretation of what constitutes actionable indecency
5
under Pacifica.1
During this time, the FCC clarified its intention
to punish only broadcasts containing any pervasive use of
expletives in a manner similar to Carlin's monologue in
55
The FCC also created a safe-harbor period between
Pacifica.1
10:00 PM and 6:00 AM.156 The FCC's restraint during this period
arguably provided broadcasters with a clear and predictable basis
for avoiding indecent broadcasts, even if it meant allowing certain
content that fit within Pacifica'sgeneric definition of indecency to
go unpunished. 5 7
In 1987, however, the FCC abandoned this restrained
enforcement approach to indecency when it issued a public notice
explicitly stating that it would expand its enforcement power to the
58
full scope allowed by Pacifica.1
It additionally stated that it
would no longer observe a strict 10:00 PM to 6:00 AM safe harbor
for indecent content, but instead would punish indecent content
that was broadcast any time "when there is a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience... ."159 This represented a
See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C. 2d 1250, 1254 (1978) ("The
Supreme Court's decision in [Pacifica] affords this Commission no general prerogative
to intervene in any case where words similar or identical to those in Pacifica are
broadcast over a licensed radio or television station. We intend to strictly observe the
narrowness of the Pacificaholding." (citation omitted)).
153 See Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 49, 90-91 (1992).
154 Application of WGBH Educ. Found, 955 F.C.C. 2d at 1254; see also Application of
Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C. 2d 750, 760-61 (1983).
15s See Application ofPacificaFound, 95 F.C.C. 2d at 760-61 (stating that a finding of
indecency requires more than the "isolated use" of certain expletives).
156 See Application of WGBH EducationFound., 69 F.C.C. 2d at 1254 n.6 ("We do not
think late evening hours such as are present here in the case of the 11:00 p.m. program
are within the intent of our Pacificadecision. Further, the single word contained in the
5:30 p.m. program should not call for us to act .....
157 See Levi, supra note 153, at 91.
158 New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur
Radio Licensees (Indecency Enforcement Standards), 2 FCC Rcd. 2726, 2726 (1987)
("[T]he Commission determined that it is more appropriate to apply the generic definition
of broadcast indecency advanced in Pacifica. . .
152

159 See id.
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broadening of enforcement for the FCC's policy beyond the brightline constraints the FCC had imposed upon itself since the Pacifica
decision. The FCC's new policy demanded that the agency
conduct a more searching inquiry into the context of an expletive's
utterance so that it may punish any and all instances of
programming that fit within the generic definition of indecency.1 60
Most importantly, this change in policy represented a complete
reversal of the FCC's interpretation of Pacifica's holding.
Previously, the Commission had held that Pacifica limited its
enforcement power to programming akin to George Carlin's
pervasive use of the "seven dirty words."l 6 1 It now held that
Pacifica only limited its enforcement power to any programming
that fit within its generic definition of indecency, with George
Carlin's monologue merely representing an extreme case.162
However, the FCC still maintained that indecency required more
than the fleeting or isolated use of sexual or excretory

expletives.163
This change in policy undoubtedly was motivated by the
marked trend of sexual liberalization that had swept through
American media during the 1970s and 1980s.164 A particularly
controversial example of this trend was the popularization of radiobased "shock jocks," such as Howard Stem, who performed
comedy involving thinly veiled sexual and excretory references,
while falling short of using any of the "dirty words" prohibited by
the FCC. 16
While these shock jocks were perhaps the most
egregious abusers of the FCC's laissez-faire enforcement scheme,
nearly every area of broadcasting, from television programs to
See Brian J. Rooder, BroadcastIndecency Regulation in the Era of the "Wardrobe
Malfunction": Has the FCC Grown Too Big for Its Britches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 871,
882-83 (2005).
161 See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C. 2d at
1254.
162 Indecency Enforcement Standards,2 FCC Rcd. at 2726.
163 See Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699 (1987) ("[S]peech
that is indecent
must involve more than an isolated use of an offensive word .... ).
164 See Barry S. Sapolsky & Barbara K. Kaye, Sex and Indecent Language on Prime
Time Television, in MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY 455 (Alan Wells & Ernest A. Hakanen
eds., 1997), available at http://sapo1sky.comm.fsu.edu/researchlbookchlSexonTV.html
(discussing the increase in sexual content and foul language exhibited on television).
165 See Goldsamt, supra note 133, at 204-06.
160
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commercials, aired an increasing amount of lewd, racy and
potentially indecent content during this time.166 Thus, while the
FCC's change in policy may have destroyed the predictability that
characterized its previously restrained approach, the new policy
was certainly a reasonably proportionate response to the scale of
controversial content that had begun filling the airways and
potentially reaching children.
Nonetheless, the sudden shift in policy received significant
judicial scrutiny. The D.C. Circuit reviewed the FCC order
announcing this change in policy on three separate occasions,
including once while sitting en banc.167 The court repeatedly held
that the order did not offend the First Amendment because it
adhered to the generic definition of indecency the Supreme Court
had approved in Pacifica.16 8 However, the court did require the
FCC to reinstate a clear safe-harbor period, stating that the
discretionary channeling system was unacceptably vague.169 In
this respect, the court recognized the danger to free speech that
could result from uncertainty "generated by a less than precise
definition of indecency plus the lack of a safe harbor for the
broadcast of (possibly) indecent material . . . ."170 This decision
echoed the concern that broadcasters might abstain from
broadcasting certain content altogether as a result of unclear
regulatory standards for indecency.
Pacifica addressed this
171
concern as well.

166 See Sapolsky & Kaye, supra note 164 ("Whereas 1970's television was willing to
imply that characters had or were about to have sex, a decade later producers dared to
show partially-nude couples in the midst of lovemaking.").
167 See generally Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACTI), 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT II), 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACTI), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
168 See ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1338-39; ACTII, 932 F.2d at 1508; ACTIII, 58 F.3d at 659.
161 See ACTIII, 58 F.3d at 669 (noting that the court's decisions in ACTI and ACT 1l
rejected a complete ban on broadcast indecency).
70 ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1342.
171 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality).
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C. The FCC'sAttempts to ClarifyIts Enforcement Policies
The FCC's new enforcement scheme persisted throughout the
1990s, resulting in large penalties for indecent broadcasts. 172
Nevertheless, the FCC repeatedly declined to impose liability for
broadcasts containing fleeting expletives throughout this period.17 3
Its rationale for declining to do so was based on a distinction
between literal and non-literal uses of indecent language: literal
"description[s] or depiction[s] of sexual or excretory functions
must be examined in context to determine whether [they are]
patently offensive,"l 74 but when a non-literal use of indecent
language is at issue, "deliberate and repetitive use . . . is a requisite

Many broadcasters felt this
to a finding of indecency."'
distinction was excessively ambiguous and demanded that the FCC
provide further guidance. 176
On March 14, 2001, the FCC attempted to provide such
guidance with the issuance of a policy statement.1 7 7 This
memorandum provided a step-by-step explanation of the FCC's
analytical approach to indecency determinations.17 8 According to
this memorandum, the FCC first must determine if the broadcast
material alleged to be indecent describes or depicts sexual or
excretory organs or activity.179 If the FCC finds that the material
does so, it next determines if the material is "patently offensive as
contemporary community standards for the broadcast
measured by
80
medium."

See Indecency Complaints and NAL's: 1993-2006, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/
eb/oip/ComplStatChart.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Indecency Complaints
andNAL's].
173 See, e.g., Lincoln Deller, Renewal of License for Stations KPRL(AM) and
KDDB(FM), 8 FCC Rcd. 2582, 2585 (1993) (holding that a news announcer's statement,
"Ooops, fucked that one up" was not indecent); see Indus. Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999,
8009 (2001) (citing L.M. Commc'ns of S.C., Inc., 7 FCC Rcd. 1595, 1595 (1992) (noting
that the comment "[t]he hell I did, I drove mother-flicker" was not held indecent)).
174 Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699 (1987).
172

17 Id.
176 Indus. Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8018.
17 See generally Indus. Guidance,
178 Id.
17

Id. at 8002.

Iso

Id.

16 FCC Rcd. at 7999.
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The memorandum clarified this second prong in three ways:
first, it stated that "community standards for the broadcast
medium"
are assessed from the perspective "of an average
broadcast viewer or listener and not the sensibilities of any
individual complainant"; 182 second, it stated that the "full context
in which the material appear[s] is critically important" for
determining whether the material is patently offensive; 8 3 finally,
the memorandum provided three principal factors to guide the
analysis under this second prong:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the
description or depiction of sexual or excretory
organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells
on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or
excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the
material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or
whether the material appears to have been
presentedfor its shock value.184
These factors are applied on a case-by-case basis, and no single
factor is considered determinative.' 8 5 The memorandum also
reiterated that "where sexual or excretory references have been
made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, this
characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of
indecency."' 86 Thus, despite the Commission's ongoing trend of
stronger enforcement, it continued to tolerate fleeting expletives.
However, it was only a matter of time before it abandoned this
limitation as well.
D. The FCC Begins a New Era ofAggressive Enforcement
Three years after issuing its policy statement, the FCC held that
fleeting expletives were indecent in the controversial 2004

181 Id. (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd. 1838, 1841
(2000)).
182 Id. (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC
Red. 1838, 1841
(2000)).
183 Id.
'"
Id. at 8003.
185 Id.
186 Id at 8008.
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Order.187 While the initial memorandum opinion by the FCC's
Enforcement Bureau held that the Golden Globes broadcast was
not indecent, particularly because the expletive's use was fleeting
and isolated,' 8 8 the Commission held on review that the expletive's
use violated Section 1464.189 The Commission's reversal was
motivated in part by unfavorable reactions from Congress to the
Enforcement Bureau's decision.' 90
Another reason for the Commission's reversal was an interest
in continuing its ongoing trend towards more aggressive
enforcement of Section 1464. In addition to holding broadcasters
liable for broadcasting material involving fleeting expletives, the
FCC changed several other facets of its policy. First, the FCC
began routinely imposing the maximum penalties allowed by
statute. 91 Between 2004 and 2005, the FCC imposed more
penalties than it had during any of the previous ten years.192 The
FCC also routinely stated its intention to revoke licenses from
broadcasters that had repeatedly violated Section 1464.19
Second, the FCC relaxed the burden of proof required for
complaints alleging that broadcasts contained indecent content.194
Prior to 2003, the FCC required complainants to supply a

See supra Part 1.
Golden Globes 1, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859, 19861 (2003).
Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4982 (2004).
'90 See S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003) (urging FCC to reconsider the Golden Globes
decision and increase enforcement activities); see also H.R. Res. 482, 108th Cong.
(2003); H.R. 3687, 108th Cong. (2003).
191 See Symposium, Panel III: Indecent Exposure? The FCC's Recent Enforcement of
Obscenity Laws, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1087, 1092-93 (2005)
[hereinafter Indecent Exposure?] (stating that the FCC's 2003 decision, Infinity
Broadcast Operations, Inc. (WRRIC-FM), 18 FCC Rcd. 6915 (2003), could be
considered the "tipping point" where more aggressive enforcement began).
192 See Indecency Complaints and NAL's, supra note 172 (showing an upward trend in
total yearly penalties imposed by the FCC since 1995); see also Indecent Exposure?,
supra note 191, at 1093 (stating that the FCC issued approximately $4,000,000 in fines in
2005, whereas it only imposed $48,000 in fines in 2000).
193 See Indecent Exposure?, supra note 191, at 1092 ("In virtually every major
indecency decision that we have done since [Infinity Broadcast Operations, Inc.
(WRRIC-FM)], the Commission has reminded broadcasters that [license forfeiture] is a
very real possibility.").
194 See id. at 1119.
187
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recording or transcription of the allegedly indecent material.'
Since 2003, the FCC has only required a brief summary of the
broadcast from the complainant; the burden then shifts to the
broadcaster to prove that the indecent material was not
broadcast.196 The FCC also began requiring broadcasters to
provide a recording or transcription of fifteen minutes of the
broadcast from either before or after the material in question.' 9 7
Third, the FCC began issuing penalties for each allegedly
indecent utterance in a program, rather than for each program
containing an indecent utterance.' 9 8 While still considering the
overall context of the program, the FCC decided that each indecent
utterance is a separate basis for liability that merits a separate
penalty.199 Additionally, the FCC began penalizing not only the
broadcaster which originally aired the program, but also any
broadcaster that might have subsequently aired the disputed
material.20 0
Lastly, the 2004 Order announced that "profanity" would be a
new and "independent" basis for finding a violation of Section
1464.201 The 2004 Order recognized that the most recent decision
construing the term "profane" in the context of Section 1464 was a
1972 decision by the Seventh Circuit, Tallman v. United States.2 02
Tallman construed "profane" to encompass "certain of those
personally reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent
resentment or denoting language which under contemporary
community standards is so grossly offensive to members of the
"

See id

196 See
197 See

id.

'98
199

See

id.

200

See Indecent Exposure?, supra note 191, at 1093.
See Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4981 (2004). While this discussion will

id.

See Entercom Kan. City Licensee, LLC, 19 FCC Rcd. 25011, 25019 (2004) ("[W]e
may issue forfeitures for each indecent utterance in a particular broadcast.").
201

be constrained to the jurisprudence of indecency, it should be noted that each of the terms
"obscene," "indecent" and "profane" contained in Section 1464 has been regarded as
having independent meaning and can form an independent basis for enforcement. See
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978) ("The words 'obscene, indecent, or
profane' are written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning.").
202
Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4981 (citing Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d
282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972)).
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public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance." 203 The
FCC applied Tallman's "nuisance rationale" to hold that Bono's
statement during the 2003 Golden Globes was profane.204 The
Commission defined "profanity" as "vulgar, irreverent, or coarse
language .

.

. to the extent such language is broadcast between 6

a.m. and 10 p.m.," and declared that it would "analyze other
99205
potentially profane words or phrases on a case-by-case basis.
Despite this rapid escalation of the FCC's enforcement, the
FCC claimed that it was still "extremely sensitive" to First
Amendment considerations.206 However, rather than implement
prophylactic policies to counterbalance the increased threat to free
speech, the FCC simply relied upon compliance with its two-prong
test for indecency to protect the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters.2 0 7 This perceived lack of concern for administrative
and constitutional law fueled the controversy that eventually
culminated in the historic Fox case.
IV. THE Fox DECISIONS

With the exception of Fox III, where the Second Circuit
conclusively held the FCC's fleeting expletive policy
unconstitutional, any discussion of the constitutional merits of the
FCC's policy by the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court in Fox I

Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972).
Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4981.
205 Id
(noting that case law regarding profanity has typically focused on the
blasphemous nature of the speech, but that the statutory definition of profanity is not
limited to blasphemous speech). The Second Circuit vigorously criticized this expansion
of the FCC's enforcement power, stating that the FCC had provided "no independent
reasons that would justify its newly-expanded definition of 'profane' speech, aside from
merely stating that its prior precedent does not prevent it from setting forth a new
definition." Fox I, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007). The court also found that the FCC's
policy was based on a misreading of Tallman and that its definition of "profane" would
substantially overlap with its definition of "indecent." Id. at 467.
206 See Indecent Exposure?, supranote 191, at 1095.
207 See generally Golden Globes II 19 FCC Rcd. at 4981. The FCC also has refrained
from applying newly adopted legal standards retroactively. See Indecent Exposure?,
supra note 191, at 1095.
203
204
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and Fox II, respectively, is dicta.20 s However, the dicta contained
in these opinions are useful here because they represent the full
spectrum of jurisprudential positions that can be taken with respect
to the First Amendment issue presented in Fox. Additionally, they
may telegraph how some justices may vote when the case
ultimately comes before them again.
A. The Second Circuit'sDecisions
In its initial decision, the Second Circuit stated that it was
"skeptical that the Commission [could] provide a reasoned
explanation for its 'fleeting expletive' regime that would pass
The court noted that the First
constitutional muster."209
Amendment protects all allegedly indecent, but not obscene,
speech.2 The court stated that it was "sympathetic to the
Networks' contention that the FCC's indecency test is undefined,
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally
vague,,211 noting that the broad reach of the FCC's policy
combined with ill-defined exceptions for "bona fide news" and
"artistic necessity" creates "an undue chilling effect on free

speech." 2 12
The Second Circuit also expressed its concern that the new
policy could allow the FCC "to sanction speech based on its
subjective view of the merit of that speech." 2 13 The court
cautioned that the FCC's approach of presuming in blanket fashion
that any and all uses of an expletive are indecent, then exempting
particular uses on a discretionary basis, makes the possibility of
subjective bias especially likely. 2 14 Finally, the Second Circuit
discussed the extent to which broadcast speech has received less
First Amendment protection than other types of speech. 2 15 The
Dicta, of course, do not constitute binding law, nor are judges bound by the opinions
they express in dicta. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta andArticle III, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1997, 2000-01 (1994).
209 Fox 1, 489 F.3d
at 462.
208

210

id
211 Id. at 463.
212

id
213 Id. at 464.
214
id
215

Id. at 464-65.
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court questioned the extent to which the justifications for this
inequity remain viable.2 16
When deciding the issue of constitutionality on remand from
the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit held that the FCC's policy
was "impermissibly vague" under the First Amendment.217 The
court focused on the broad expansion of the FCC's discretion to
declare content indecent and the extent to which this discretion was
or was not limited by predictable guidelines.2 18 The court
discussed contrasting examples where the FCC found that content
was "patently offensive," fell within one of the enumerated
exceptions for a "bona fide news broadcast," or was essential to the
"artistic integrity" of a program. 2 19 The court found "little rhyme
or reason" to the FCC's decisions and was concerned that
broadcasters would be "left to guess whether an expletive will be
deemed 'integral' to a program or whether the FCC will consider a
particular broadcast a 'bona fide news interview."' 220 Finally, the
court found that the inherent vagueness of the FCC's policy is
likely to chill valuable broadcast speech.2 2 '
The court also reiterated its initial concern that such broad
discretion creates a "risk that [the Commission's] decisions
[regarding indecency] will reflect the officials' subjective
biases."22 2 Such a risk becomes graver in the absence of clear
guidelines for the Commission's decisions, and the court held that
such guidelines were lacking in this case.2 23 The court concluded
that a higher standard must be met to justify the expansion of the
See id at 465.
See Fox I, 613 F.3d 317, 330 (2d Cir. 2010).
218 id.
219 Id. at 330-32.
220 Id. at 332. The court noted that the "flexibility" the FCC sought to preserve
through
the inclusion of such broad discretion came at the cost of eliminating any fair warning to
broadcasters of what content is actionably indecent. Id. The court also noted the lack of
any enforcement actions immediately following the Pacifica decision when the
Commission adhered to a very narrow and clear program of enforcement. See id. at 33031; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
221 Fox III, 613 F.3d at 334.
Among other examples, the court noted several
broadcasters' refusal to air an award-winning "9/11" documentary as a result of the
policy. Id
222 Id. at 332.
223 Id. at 333.
216
217
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FCC's discretion, stating that "the FCC should bend over
backwards to create a standard that gives broadcasters the notice
that is required by the First Amendment." 224
B. The Supreme Court's Various Viewpoints
The Supreme Court provided a more diverse discussion of the
constitutionality of the FCC's policy. The views of the Court on
this issue were divided into three perspectives. The first and most
conservative group consisted of Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito and
Kennedy. 225 In his plurality opinion for the Court, in which
Justices Roberts, Alito and Kennedy concurred, Justice Scalia
obliquely addressed the issue of whether the FCC's policy is
constitutional, while still explicitly invoking the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance and refusing to issue a definitive ruling on
the issue.
Justice Scalia noted that the Court in Pacifica "drew no
constitutional line; to the contrary, it particularly declined to
express any view on the constitutionality of prohibiting isolated
indecency."226 He used this premise to argue that Pacifica placed
no special burden on the FCC to explain why adopting a more
restrictive rule than the one at issue in Pacifica is not
unconstitutional.2 2 7 Justice Scalia also echoed Justice Stevens in
Pacifica, stating, "any chilled references to excretory and sexual
material 'surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern. . . ."'228

The second and more liberal group consisted of Justices
Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter. While this group generally
agreed that the FCC exceeded the bounds of its constitutional
authority under the First Amendment, they did not argue that the
224
225

id.
See generally Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).

Id. at 1817 (Scalia, J., plurality).
Id. at 1817-18. While Justice Scalia made this argument in the context of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the logic also could support an argument that the Pacifica
decision did not define the outer limits of the FCC's authority. However, it should be
noted that Justice Scalia expressly disavowed making any such argument regarding the
constitutionality of the FCC's policy. See id, at 1818 n.7.
228 Id. at 1819 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (Stevens, J.
plurality)).
226
227
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First Amendment prohibits any indecency regulation by the
FCC. 229 Speaking most strongly of all the members of the Court
on the issue of constitutionality, Justice Stevens argued in his
dissent that the Pacifica decision narrowly defined the term
"indecent" in the context of Section 1464 to include only "those
words that describe sex or excrement."230 He argued that this
implies a "critical [contextual] distinction between the use of an
expletive to describe a sexual or excretory function and the use of
such a word for an entirely different purpose, such as to express an
emotion. One rests at the core of indecency; the other stands miles
apart." 23 1 He seems to interpret "indecency" as a concept that is
necessarily context-specific, one that requires not only the use of
words in a certain cognizable order, but the overall conveyance of
an intended message in a particular context that conveys the image
of "sexual or excretory activity." 232 More importantly, he also
clearly rejects the FCC's conclusion that certain words necessarily
describe sex or excrement, regardless of the context or intention of
their use.
Justice Ginsberg's dissent echoed this distinction, stating,
"there is no way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment
casts over what the Commission has done." 233 She argued that the
FCC's gradually expanding regulatory approach is offensive to the
American tradition of free expression and cultural tolerance: 234
"[W]e should be mindful that words unpalatable to some may be
'commonplace' 5 for
others,
'the
stuff of everyday
23

conversations."'

Justice Thomas' view was perhaps the most liberal. In his
concurrence on the statutory issue, Thomas argued vigorously that
broadcast speech deserves protection under the First Amendment
equal to any other form of speech that is protected by the First

229

See generally id.

230

Id at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

231

id

Id. at 1825.
Id. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 1829.
235 Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan,
J.,
dissenting)).
232

233
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Amendment.236 He contended that Pacificawas wrongly decided
because the initial justifications for providing less protection to
broadcast speech have no basis in the Constitution. 237 In
particular, he argued that the "spectrum scarcity" rationale put
forth in the 1969 decision Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC23 8
was deeply flawed at the time of its inception and has become
increasingly illogical over time.2 3 9
The Red Lion decision held that the scarce nature of the
broadcast spectrum necessitates government regulation in a
manner that could suppress free speech because "[w]ithout
government control, the medium would be of little use because of
the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be
clearly and predictably heard." 240 Justice Thomas rejected the
notion that spectrum scarcity is relevant when deciding the scope
of First Amendment protection for certain kinds of speech, arguing
that "the original meaning of the Constitution cannot turn on
modem necessity . . . ."241
He further argued that modem
technological advances in television and radio have undermined
the spectrum scarcity argument, as well as claims from FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation242 that broadcast media has established a
"uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans and that
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children ....
On this

See id. at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The text of the First Amendment makes
no distinctions among print, broadcast, and cable media, but we have done so . . . ."
(quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 812
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
237 Id. at 1820-21.
238
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
239
Fox H1, 129 S. Ct. at 1820.
240 RedLion Broad.Co., 395 U.S. at 376.
241 Fox ll, 129 S. Ct.
at 1820.
242 438 U.S. 726, 748 (Stevens, J., plurality) (1978).
243
Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1820. Among the technological advances that Justice Thomas
mentioned are the dramatic increase in the number of broadcast stations in existence from
1969 to 2004 and the digitization of broadcast television transmission. Id. at 1821.
Justice Thomas argued that claims about broadcast media's pervasiveness have been
eroded by the bundling of broadcast media with cable or satellite services, the creation of
Internet broadcasting and the creation of parental screening technology, such as the Vchip. Id. at 1822.
236
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basis, Justice Thomas argued that both Red Lion and Pacifica
ought to be reconsidered.2 44
V.

THE NEXT STEP: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE OF REGULATION
AND FREE SPEECH

Despite the many viewpoints expressed regarding the proper
basis for deciding this particularly thorny issue of constitutional
law, it is relatively easy to construct a continuum ranging from the
most "regulation friendly" rationale to the most "free speech
friendly" rationale. What complicates the issue, however, is that
the proper balance does not necessarily lie in the middle of the
spectrum. A proper basis for deciding the case arguably could be
the wholesale disposal of the FCC's regulatory power over
indecent content, as advocated by Justice Thomas, 245 or an
expansive interpretation of the FCC's power based on the allegedly
limited First Amendment value of indecent speech, as advocated
by Justice Scalia.2 46 Thus, the best method for analyzing this issue
is to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of every possible
perspective along this continuum.
A. Should PacificaBe Overturned?
A proper starting point is the far-reaching argument advanced
by Justice Thomas that any indecency regulation by the FCC is
unconstitutional because broadcast speech deserves full First
Amendment protection, rather than the limited protection it
currently receives under Red Lion and Pacifica.247 The premise of
this argument is that the often-criticized "spectrum scarcity"
rationale put forth in Red Lion is critically flawed and should be
discarded.2 48 For instance, Justice Thomas argued in Fox II that
the original meaning of the First Amendment does not change
because modern technological advancements have made certain
Id. at 1822.
See id at 1819-20.
246 See id at 1819.
247 See supra Part III.B.
248 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468
U.S. 364, 376 n.1 1 (1984)
("The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has come
under increasing criticism in recent years.").
244

245
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forms of speech more pervasive than others. 249 He advocates
adherence to the originalist notion that "[c]onstitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes)
even future judges think that scope too broad." 250
While this argument does have a certain intuitive appeal, as
well as a strong pedigree, it is based on a mistaken understanding
of indecency regulation. In Pacifica,the majority opinion actively
resisted relying upon the spectrum scarcity argument as a
justification for prohibiting indecent content, possibly because the
majority recognized the inevitability of a less scarce media
spectrum through technological advancements.2 5 1 Instead, the
majority in Pacifica based its opinion on the social impact of
broadcasting, particularly on unwilling viewers and children. 2 52
Any disagreement with Red Lion would be more relevant to Fox if
framed as a general disagreement with the FCC's ability to
substantively regulate electronic media. 253 However, the social
impact of certain broadcasts on children and unwilling listeners
does not change depending on the scarcity of the broadcast
spectrum, particularly when the broadcast media at issue is overthe-air radio and television, which many American families still
rely upon heavily for entertainment and news. Moreover, while
the Supreme Court has subsequently recognized that the First
Amendment limits the scarcity rationale for broadcast

Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1822 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1820-21 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35
(2008)).
251 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The
249
250

opinions of my Brothers Powell and Stevens rightly refrain from relying on the notion of
'spectrum scarcity' to support their result.").
252
See id. at 748-50 (Stevens, J., plurality) (stating that broadcast speech is subject to
less First Amendment protection that other forms of speech because it is "uniquely
pervasive" in the private homes of American citizens and "uniquely accessible" to
children).
253 The Court has never endorsed this position, but many have defended it. See, e.g.,
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding that
content-specific broadcast regulations are subject to strict scrutiny); League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 n.11.
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regulation, 254 the Court has never held that the FCC is prohibited
from promulgating content-oriented regulations for certain forms

of media. 2 55
A second argument would be that modem technological
advancements have rendered broadcast television and radio less
"uniquely pervasive" than they were at the time of the Red Lion
and Pacifica decisions. 256 Moreover, technological solutions have
developed to prevent the inadvertent exposure of children to
indecent television or radio programming. 257 Thus, the "transitory
facts" 2 58 that once rendered broadcast regulation a necessity no
longer exist. Indeed, the FCC repeatedly has discussed the ability
of other kinds of media, such as the Internet and cable television,
to block or censor broadcasts containing indecent material as a less
restrictive alternative to FCC regulation that renders the
enforcement of the FCC's indecency policy substantially
overbroad.2 59 Justice Thomas argued in Fox II that this change
justifies overturning Red Lion and Pacifica.260
A straightforward response might be that this change in factual
circumstances is insufficient to subvert the underlying rationale of
See Uli Widmaier, German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for a New First
Amendment?, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 75, 145 (1998).
255 See, e.g., Nat'1 Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943)
("[W]e are
asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer . .. [b]ut the Act does not
restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.").
256 Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1821-22 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
257 Id. (discussing examples of such technology, including the V-Chip, the packaging
of
cable and satellite services and the Internet); see also Stacy Katz, Note, The Lewd, Crude,
or PartiallyNude: Indecency Regulation, Fleeting Expletives, and the High Price We Pay
for Not-So-Free "FreeSpeech, " 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 347, 380 (2010) (discussing other
examples of content-blocking technology).
258
Fox ll, 129 S. Ct. 1800.
259 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Playboy Entm't Grp.,
Inc., 529
U.S. at 803; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
260 See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1822. What is especially interesting about this argument is
that the FCC alleged that its policy was not arbitrary or capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act because the development of tape delay and other forms of
broadcast censoring technology would alleviate any burden its change in policy would
place on broadcasters. Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4980 (2004). Justice
Thomas seems to turn this argument against the FCC by stating that if broadcasters have
already adopted technological alternatives to address the problem of fleeting expletives,
then what need is there for the FCC to take action?
254
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either case, but especially Pacifica. The FCC could allow for these
alternatives to exist, but still react when it receives a complaint
from a parent or viewer for whom these alternatives have failed.26 1
However, a closer analysis of indecency jurisprudence, particularly
cases involving FCC regulation of cable television, reveals that
targeted blocking technology is a less restrictive alternative to the
FCC's reactive complaint process.26 2 This implies that the
existence of technological alternatives for blocking indecent
content on non-cable airways renders the FCC's policy of
punishing indecent broadcast content substantially overbroad and
an unnecessary infringement on protected broadcast speech.2 63
Another response might be that this argument myopically
considers only the increase in the number of technological methods
of combating indecent broadcast content. It does not similarly
consider any increase in the amount of indecent broadcast content.
The justification for the development of technological censoring
alternatives, as well as the FCC's expanding enforcement of
indecency regulation, has been the increasingly pervasive presence
of indecent content in modern broadcasting. The FCC recognized
that it would be failing its obligations to the public if it did not
expand its enforcement to keep pace with the increasing amount of
indecent broadcast content on the airways. 2 6

261

See Courtney Livingston Quale, Note, Hear an [Expletive], There an [Expletive],

but[t] . . . The Federal Communications Commission Will Not Let You Say an

[Expletive], 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 237 (2008) (detailing the FCC's reactive
regulatory approach).
262 See, e.g., Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 815 ("Simply put, targeted blocking
is less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot ban speech if targeted
blocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling interests.").
263 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877. One commentator has noted that the expense of
implementing pre-broadcast review technology is especially onerous for local
broadcasters, who may be left with no choice but to cease providing live coverage of
local events. Stuart Benjamin, FCC v. Fox and the Demise of Local Broadcasting,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 9, 2009, 9:06 AM), http://volokh.com/archives/
Although only 14% of
archive_2009_05_03-2009 05_09.shtml#1241874410.
households rely on over-the-air television broadcasting, the comparative expense of
censoring technology for individual viewers is far less onerous. See id.
264 See Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd.
at 4975.
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B. Can the FCC'sFleetingExpletive Policy Survive Strict
Scrutiny?
While these arguments may not resolve the issue of whether
the FCC's fleeting expletive policy is constitutional, they highlight
the appropriate perspective for analyzing the issue. The focus
should be on the original basis for deciding Pacificaand the extent
to which that rationale binds the FCC to regulate indecency in a
certain way that is consistent with the First Amendment. The
general authority of the FCC to regulate broadcast media is not
called into question so long as the FCC is not excessively
enforcing content-specific restrictions on broadcast speech that is
protected by the First Amendment. 265 Given that the First
Amendment protects all indecent speech, however minimally, any
content-specific regulation by the FCC that prohibits indecent
speech must survive strict scrutiny.266 The issue then becomes the
extent to which the FCC's fleeting expletives policy is narrowly
tailored to the state's compelling interest in regulating indecent

broadcasts. 267
The opinions of the Second Circuit, Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens are more relevant in this respect. The Second Circuit
provides a complete discussion of the issue on remand from the
Supreme Court. 268 The opinion in Fox III holds that the FCC's
fleeting expletive policy is unconstitutionally vague under the First
Amendment. 2 69 The Second Circuit emphasized that broadcasters
will be deterred from exercising their rights under the First
Amendment if the FCC fails to provide clear guidelines for the
regulation of indecent broadcast content. 270 The court held that the
exceptions to the broad reach of the FCC's prohibition on fleeting
expletives were not sufficiently discernable and created excessive

See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality).
See Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813; Sable Conmc'ns of Cal. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
267 See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., 492 U.S.
at 126.
268
See generally Fox III, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
269 See id. at 330.
270
Id. at 334.
265

266
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discretion for FCC officials to selectively punish certain broadcasts
271
based on their viewpoints.
The Second Circuit justified its arguments with examples of
what it considers to be inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement of
the FCC's policy. 272 While the arbitrariness of the FCC's prior
decisions is debatable, the Second Circuit is clearly more
concerned with the chilling effect on broadcast speech that might
result from any impression of arbitrary decision-making by the
FCC.2 73 This concern echoes those articulated by the Supreme
Court in its prior restraint jurisprudence, which forbids
administrative agencies from arbitrarily denying licenses or
permits for speech precisely because such denials chill free
speech.2 74 There is a separate issue, however, of whether a chilling
effect resulting from the FCC's policy rises to the level of a serious
First Amendment violation to the same extent as an overt prior
restraint on speech. The Court could conclude that the interest in
protecting children and unwitting audiences from indecent
broadcasts could be considered to outweigh the threat of chilling
broadcast speech of questionable constitutional merit.
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has regarded profane and
indecent speech as entitled to full First Amendment protection only
tentatively, and, even when it has, it has not consistently applied
the same rigorous standard of review that it has applied to other
forms of content-specific regulations.2 7 5 Moreover, Pacifica
implied that indecent broadcast speech is less worthy of First

Id. at 331-33.
Id. at 333 (contrasting the disparate treatment of Saving PrivateRyan, a popular war
movie, and The Blues, a musical documentary).
273 See id ("It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive
threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion."
(quoting Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 n.10 (1992))).
274
See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952). Although,
by definition, a prior restraint is one placed on speech before it occurs-in contrast to the
FCC's indecency adjudications which occur afterwards-the specter of unelected
bureaucrats using their broad discretion to censor speech is common to both situations.
275
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 565, 566-68 (1991); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 56 n.12 (1976).
271

272

2011]

THE FATE OFINDECENCY

1077

Amendment protection than other forms of speech.2 76 The Court
may use this case as an opportunity to swing the balance back in
favor of greater administrative deference by holding that indecent
speech, like obscenity and defamation, is further than other forms
of speech from the underlying purpose of the First Amendment to
"assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people." 277
However, even if the Court decides to adopt this position, the
mere fact that indecent broadcast speech is less deserving of First
Amendment protection than other speech may not fully justify the
FCC's policy. The Court could still conclude that the FCC's
policy is rendered superfluous by the existence of alternate forms
of broadcast media, such as cable television and the Internet, as
well as the existence of new technology for blocking television
broadcasts, such as the V-chip 278 and broadcast delay.279
Additionally, the Court could conclude that the discretionary
nature of the FCC's policy creates the possibility of the
Commission's engaging in viewpoint discrimination under the
guise of indecency regulation.
However, should the Court
conclude that indecent speech is entitled to less than full First
Amendment protection and that the FCC's policy is not void for
vagueness or susceptible to discriminatory application, more than
an alleged chilling effect on the broadcasting of potentially
indecent speech would be required to prove that the FCC's policy
is unconstitutional.2 80 Indeed, deterring potential violations of
Section 1464 constitutes a major purpose of the FCC's
enforcement power, even if deterring some legitimate speech is a

See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality)
("While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of
First Amendment concern.").
277
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
278 See V-Chip: Viewing Television Responsibly, FCC.GOV (July 8, 2003),
http://transition.fcc.gov/vchip ("The V-Chip reads information encoded in the rated
program and blocks programs from the set based upon the rating selected by the
parent.").
279 See Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4982 (2004) ("[L]icensees could have
easily avoided the indecency violation here by delaying the broadcast for a period of time
sufficient for them to effectively bleep the offending word.").
280 See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 743 (Stevens,
J., plurality).
276
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natural consequence of such enforcement.281 A chilling effect on
protected speech that results from the FCC's enforcement of
Section 1464 should only rise to the level of a First Amendment
violation if the enforcement policy chills substantially more
protected speech than "indecent" speech.2 8 2 To put it more simply,
the Court must ultimately decide whether any fleeting expletive
could be considered "indecent" under Section 1464, and if so,
whether the FCC can properly adjudicate which fleeting expletives
are indecent without excessively burdening protected speech.
C. What is Indecent Speech?
The comments of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens provide the
most guidance in determining whether any particular speech is
"indecent." Neither Justice is oblivious to the importance of
properly interpreting Pacifica in this regard. Justice Scalia does
not take the position that Pacifica represents the outer limit of the
FCC's regulatory ambit.283 Nor does he state that Pacifica
expressed any opinion as to the constitutionality of regulating
fleeting expletives. 284 Justice Stevens agrees that Pacifica was a
critically narrow decision.285 However, he states that a limiting
principle put forth in Pacificawas that the FCC may regulate only
"patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and
activities."28 6 His argument is that not all fleeting expletives fulfill
such criteria.2 87
Justice Stevens bases this argument upon a significant
distinction between an indecent word and an indecent use of a
word.2 88 He believes that only the latter is subject to regulation by

281

See id.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1948).
See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009).
284
See id.
285
Id. at 1826-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286
Id. at 1827 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (Stevens, J.,
plurality) (1978)).
287
id
288 Id. ("Even if the words that concern the Court in this case sometimes retain
their
sexual or excretory meaning, there are surely countless instances in which they are used
in a manner unrelated to their origin.").
282

283
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289
Indecent words, while typically discouraged by the
the FCC.
FCC and broadcasters alike, can be used in a multitude of
legitimate contexts. 290 Erwin Chemerinsky also provided a
commonsense explanation of this distinction: "I don't think that
Cher, in saying to her critics, 'Go fuck 'em' was really saying she
wanted to have sexual relations with them." 29 1 When compounded
with Justice Ginsburg's claim that the meaning and offensiveness
of certain words depend on cultural context, 292 Chemerinsky's
argument becomes extremely persuasive.293
Justice Scalia takes a very different view of the FCC's policy.
He insists that the FCC has not adopted a presumption of
indecency for all fleeting expletives, but instead relies upon a
context-based determination for each allegedly indecent term.2 94
This interpretation misconceives the nature of Justice Stevens'
position and the FCC's policy. By its own admission, the FCC's
policy begins with the presumption that certain words invariably
fulfill the "subject-matter" prong of the indecency analysis. 295 It is
this presumption that is problematic because such words do not
invariably depict or describe "sexual or excretory activities or
organs." 296 Both this inquiry and the "patent offensiveness"
analysis require consideration of the context of a word's use, rather
289

See id. at 1827-28.

Justice Stevens cites as examples the use of such words as
emotional intensifiers.
291 Wunews, Constitutional Law Expert Erwin Chemerinsky, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 18,
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-MeJvsnQ9dd4.
292
See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1829 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
293 See id at 1828 n.5. Justice Stevens also cites Justice Thomas' argument
concerning
technological means of censoring expletives as reasoning supporting a restrained
regulatory approach by the FCC towards indecent speech. See id.
294 Id. at 1815 ("And we find no basis for the contention that the Commission has now
adopted a presumption of indecency; its repeated reliance on context refutes this claim.")
(Scalia, J., majority).
295
See Golden Globes II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4978 (2004) ("[W]e believe that, given
the core meaning of the 'F-Word', any use of that word or a variation, in any context,
inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within the first prong of our
indecency definition.").
296
Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1806 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 56 FCC Rcd. 94, 98
(1975)). "As any golfer who has watched his partner shank a short approach knows, it
would be absurd to accept the suggestion that the resultant four-letter word uttered on the
golf course describes sex or excrement and is therefore indecent." Id. at 1827.
290 See id at 1827.
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than assuming that particular words invariably have a particular
meaning that could form the basis of a patently offensive use. 297
Justice Scalia's contextual inquiry merely refers to the "patent
offensiveness" inquiry, specifically the exceptions for artistic
integrity and bona fide news. 298 He argues that these exceptions
imply that the FCC still only considers a word's use indecent based
on the context in which it appears. 299 However, when these
exceptions apply, it is not because the FCC has determined that the
terms at issue do not describe sex or excrement. Rather, it is
because the Commission believes the declared indecency of the
term's use is acceptable because it protects the state's greater
interest in preserving bona fide news broadcasts or the artistic
integrity of certain broadcasts. 300 The analysis still begins from the
presumption that such words are per se indecent, regardless of the
context in which they are used. Not only does this imply that the
FCC now may sanction broadcasts for utilizing expletives in a
manner that is inconsistent with the Commission's own conception
of what is an acceptable form of news reporting or artistic
statement, 30 1 but it also proves Justice Stevens' argument that the
FCC has expanded the boundaries of its power beyond those
originally constructed in Pacifica by shifting its regulatory focus
from the context in which words are used to the words

themselves. 302
Upon examining prior cases, it appears that Justice Scalia
himself has adopted the view that content-based discrimination
between different forms of speech, even if that speech is not fully
protected by the First Amendment, is impermissible under the First

297

See id. at 1806, 1812.

298 Id at 1814 (citing Saving Private Ryan, 20 FCC Rcd. 4507, 4513 (2005)).
299

See id.
See generally Mr. Peter Branton, 6 FCC Rcd. 610, 610 (1991) (holding that the use
of expletives in a "bona fide news" broadcast was not "patently offensive," while also
noting that the repetitious use of coarse words is undoubtedly offensive to many
viewers); Saving Private Ryan, 20 FCC Rcd. 4507, 4513 (2005) (holding that repetitious
use of expletives in a film was not indecent where the use was intended to convey the
horrors of World War II, rather than to titillate or pander).
301 Fox III, 613 F.3d 317, 332-33 (2d Cir. 2010). Such an implication lends credence to
the Second Circuit's concern regarding discriminatory enforcement.
302 See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300
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3 0 3 Justice Scalia
Amendment. In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,
authored a majority opinion striking down as substantially
overbroad a Minnesota statute that prohibited:
[Placing] on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
304
or gender .
Justice Scalia argued that the statute impermissibly
discriminated between different forms of speech based on the
viewpoint of the speaker.3 05 However, he also conceded that such
speech is punishable under the "fighting words" doctrine, and lies
outside of the protection of the First Amendment.30 6 When
attempting to reconcile these views, he argued that categories of
speech that the Court has held to be "not within the area of
[constitutional protection]" are not "entirely invisible to the
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable
content." 307 He makes clear that even speech entirely unprotected
cannot be punished because of its message:
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound
truck: Each is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a
'mode of speech,' . . . both can be used to convey an
idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon
the First Amendment. As with the sound truck,
however, so also with fighting words: The
government may not regulate use based on
hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying
message expressed. 308

303 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
304 Id. at 380, (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn.,

Legis. Code
305
306
307

§ 292.02 (1990)).

See generally id.
Id. at 319.
Id at 384-85.

308 Id at 386.
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It seems strange that Justice Scalia would insist that speech
which he admits is entirely unprotected by the First Amendment is
entitled to protection from viewpoint-based discrimination, while
accepting the result of a scheme that grants the FCC an immense
amount of discretion to selectively punish speech that is protected
by the First Amendment. Indeed, the Court has construed Justice
Scalia's opinion in R.A. V as standing for the proposition that the
FCC may not use its regulatory power over broadcast media to
exercise "control over the content of messages expressed by
private individuals." 309 Moreover, R.A. V is not the only case in
which Justice Scalia has held that a content-specific restriction on
speech unnecessarily burdens protected speech. 310 Thus, Justice
Scalia misses his own point that even allegedly "contextual"
inquiries into the indecency of speech can violate the First
Amendment if they create a substantial risk of suppressing
protected speech. He seems to accept the FCC's discretionary
scheme despite the clear danger that the FCC may use its
discretion to selectively punish particular viewpoints under the
pretext of punishing indecency.
Justice Stevens' argument should sound the death knell for the
FCC's fleeting expletive policy. It is unacceptable for the FCC to
use its authority to ascribe definitional qualities to certain words
that do not actually exist. The First Amendment requires nothing
less than the respect for a speaker's ability to express a completely
legitimate and decent message through the use of words that may
be considered indecent when used in a separate context. The
Supreme Court has adhered to this principle for even longer than it
has sanctioned the FCC's battle against indecent broadcast
speech.3 1 1

309

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (citing RAV. v. St. Paul,

505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992)).
310 See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("We cannot sanction the view that
the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little
or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.").
311
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D. Several PossibleResolutions of the Fox Case
The First Amendment issue could unfold in a few different
ways. The first possibility is that the FCC could accept the Second
Circuit's holding that the FCC's policy is unconstitutionally vague
in violation of the First Amendment. The second possibility is that
the FCC could move for the Second Circuit to rehear the case en
banc. The final possibility is that that the FCC could appeal the
case to the Supreme Court, in which case the Court could either
grant or deny certiorari to hear the case. However, regardless of
which court has the final say on the case, the ultimate disposition
will no doubt draw the interest of broadcasters and lawmakers
alike.
Should the case come before the Supreme Court yet again, the
Court could possibly, though unlikely, overrule Pacifica,as Justice
Thomas suggests, so that it can wholly dispose of the FCC's ability
to regulate indecency. A more likely scenario is that the Court will
not overrule Pacifica and will only decide on the narrow issue of
whether the FCC's policy violates the First Amendment. An
interesting wrinkle is the presence of two new Justices on the
Supreme Court, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, as both were
appointed to the Court after Fox I. While these Justices are
generally considered liberal jurists, their views concerning First
Amendment jurisprudence are not wholly consistent with those of
their predecessors, Justice Souter and Justice Stevens. 3 12 Their
votes could ultimately control the disposition of the case.
However, it should also be noted that the comments provided by
the Justices in Fox II are not binding nor are they completely
reliable indications of how the Justices will rule, should they
confront this issue in the future. 313
Additionally, Justice
Sotomayor did not participate in the decision to grant certiorari,

See generally Brandon J. Almas, From One [Expletive] Policy to the Next: The
FCC's Regulation of "FleetingExpletives" and the Supreme Court's Response, 63 FED.
COMM. L.J. 261 (2010) (discussing the judicial records of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan
in cases involving First Amendment claims and comparing them with those of Justices
Souter and Stevens).
313 For a discussion of a recent landmark decision by the Supreme Court involving a
content-specific restriction on free speech, see supra note 97.
312
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which might imply that she will recuse herself entirely from the

case. 3 14
CONCLUSION

Free speech is the lifeblood of a democratic society. Protecting
the ability of citizens in a democracy to express their viewpoints
freely without the threat of retaliation from their government is
essential for ensuring social progress and freedom from tyranny.
A conflict arises when society denounces the use of certain "dirty"
words to express a message while remaining committed to the
protection of free speech at all costs. The FCC's indecency
regulation attempts to balance society's interests in protecting free
speech and protecting social morality by forbidding the use of
these "dirty" words when it is reasonable to believe that they may
offend the sensibilities of innocent broadcast viewers. This Note
addresses the ways in which the FCC's regulation has become
counter-productive in such a way that it now offends the First
Amendment.
Speakers use these "dirty" words precisely because they are
offensive and have the potential to draw more attention to the
speaker's message. Expanding the institutional prohibition on
broadcasting these words only serves to augment their emotive
appeal. The absurd abhorrence the FCC's regulation exhibits
towards any use of these words is best summarized in George
Carlin's famous monologue:
Well, we have more ways to describe dirty words
than we actually have dirty words. That seems a
little strange to me. It seems to indicate that
somebody was awfully interested in these words.
They kept referring to them. They called them
"bad," "dirty," "filthy," "foul," "vile," "vulgar,"
314 See Order List, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 3 (June 27, 2011),

http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062711zor.pdf; Harry Cole, First
Amendment Face-Off Supremes to Consider ConstitutionalityofFCC Indecency Regime,
CoMMLAWBLOG (Jun. 27, 2011), http://www.commlawblog.com/2011/06/articles/
broadcast/first-amendment-faceoff-supremes-to-consider-constitutionality-of-fccindecency-regime.
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"coarse," "in poor taste," "unseemly," "street talk,"
"gutter talk," "locker room language," "barracks
talk," "bawdy," "naughty," "saucy," "raunchy,"
"rude," "crude," "lewd," "lascivious," "indecent,"
"profane," "obscene," "blue," "off-color," "risqu6,"
"suggestive," "cursing," "cussing," "swearing;" and
all I could think of was "shit," "piss," "fuck,"
"cunt," "cocksucker," "motherfucker," and "tits,"
man!3 15
Carlin's point is that the idea of a "dirty" word can overshadow
the reality of what these words actually are. They are nothing
more than vessels for the expression of a speaker's message, but
they do not necessarily convey any particular message. When the
FCC becomes blind to the notion that these are simply words, not
the elements of an evil incantation, its regulations create a genuine
threat to free speech. The FCC's regulation of fleeting expletives
is one example of when this threat becomes real.

poptentv, George Carlin and the Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television in
Kinetic Typography, YOUTUBE (May 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-s8vIQHmcqZ8.
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